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  Over the last century, both Canada and Australia have experienced urbanization, with an increasing share of 
the population concentrated in large urban areas.  Local governments, which scarcely existed at the time of 
Canada's Confederation in 1867, were given no place in the constitution.    However, since 1867, local governments 
have become the major providers of people-oriented services.  Local governments were initially self-financing, 
but they have become unable to pay for the increasing range of services called for in modern local governments.  
As a result, more and more of the financing of local government services was being taken over by the Provincial 
Governments.  Small neighborhoods have always been apprehensive that they would be overwhelmed in the 
resulting large-scale, homogenized urban areas.
i  The Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto (hereafter Metro 
Toronto), established in 1954, went a long way towards reconciling the conflict between the efficiency of 
large-scale organization and consumer-oriented local communities in a federal form of urban government. 
 
  This paper discusses the effects of the sweeping changes to this system introduced by the current Government 
of Ontario elected in 1995.    Their policy is to reverse the trend of the last century by shifting the financing of local 
services back to local governments, enabling provincial income tax rates to be reduced.  In Metro Toronto, the 
mechanism to achieve this result is the amalgamation of  the diverse communities into a single city, which is 
intended to become self-financing.    Since the financial resources available to local governments are limited mainly 
to  the property tax, the implementation of the program would redistribute the tax burden, imposing heavy and 
somewhat arbitrary burdens on Metro Toronto businesses, and create a massive redistribution of income among 
households, with the heaviest burden falling on middle-income groups. 
 
1.  The Foundation of Metropolitan Toronto 
 
  Before Metro was created there were many problems in the metropolitan area in and around Toronto.  These 
stemmed from the rapid growth of population and industry in Canada over the last 60 years, and from a shift in 
economic activity within Canada to the southern Ontario region centred on Toronto. 
 
  Before the 1950s, the Toronto-centred economy was essentially the City itself, incorporated in 1834.  Even 
as recently as 1951, the City of Toronto was still 60 per cent of the Toronto Census Metropolitan Area (CMA).
ii  
After 1951, the City's population stabilized and growth shifted to the surrounding municipalities, which legally 
were independent jurisdictions but economically were components of the extended Toronto economy (see Table 1). 
 
  The administrative requirements of the new urban economy strained the capabilities of the pre-Metro 
municipal model. On the supply side, City government was responsible for public transportation, water supply and 
sewage, roads and streets, electricity distribution, education and the regulation of land use.  Administratively, 
these functions were relatively straightforward in the small community. But it became chaotic when many 
communities were competing for land around the central core.  This was true not only for the industrial and 
commercial users of land, but also for residential users who were concerned about getting to work, their needs for 
schools, shopping and recreation, and their own individual preferences for congenial neighbourhoods. 
 
  The Province's solution was a two-tiered system that could encompass a variety of jurisdictions. The first was 
the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, created in 1954, a federation of Toronto and its suburbs in the southern 








  POPULATION:    CITY OF TORONTO AND SUBURBS 
  1961  1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 
East York  C 104,780  106,950 101,970 101,090 102,700  107,822
Etobicoke  C 282,690  297,110 298,710 302,970 309,990  328,718
North York  C 504,150  558,400 559,520 556,300 562,560  589,653
Scarborough  C 338,020  387,150 443,350 484,680 524,600  558,960
Toronto 672,407  712,790  633,320 599,220 612,290 635,400  653,784
York  C 147,300  141,370 134,620 135,400 140,530  146,534
Total Metro  C 2,089,730  2,124,300 2,137,390 2,192,730 2,275,780  2,385,780
Total GTA  C 2,922,920  3,180,110 3,417,720 3,733,090 4,235,790  4,628,883
Total CMA
* C 2,628,043  2,803,101 3,130,392 3,427,168 3,893,000  4,263,757
 
Source:    Background Report 1, GTA Demographic Profile, July 1995.    In this document, the GTA consists of the 




 Table  2 
  MUNICIPALITY OF METROPOLITAN TORONTO, 1954-1997
**
  Distribution of Responsibilities 
METROPOLITAN TORONTO  CITIES/BOROUGH SHARED  RESPONSIBILITIES 
Metro Police 








Sewer and water service 
Child care 
Reference libraries 
Homes for the aged 
Garbage disposal 
Processing of recyclables 
Metro Zoo 
Business licensing 
Municipal gold courses 
Expressways and their lighting 
Exhibition Place 
Toronto Islands/ferry service 
Hummingbird Centre 
Fire protection 




Collection of garbage and 
  recyclables 









Recreation and community 
  centres 
Tax collection 






Solid waste management 
Libraries 









                     
     
*For census purposes, a Census Metropolitan Area (CMA) represents the main labour market of a continuous built-up 
area having a population of 100,000 or more. 
     
**The Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto comprised the Borough of East York and the cities of Etobicoke, North 
York, Scarborough, Toronto and York. 
  The result was an urban entity that came closer to the economist's concept of an efficient city
iv than the earlier 




scale or where there were important spillovers of costs or benefits over local boundaries, such as sewage and water 
supply, and transportation.  At the same time, local services where benefits were more closely focussed on 
household preferences or called for active citizen participation, such as elementary schools, fire services and local 
parks, were assigned to the local municipalities. The Tiebout model recognized that different communities had 
different preferences for local government services.  A system of smaller, more homogeneous local governments 
was more efficient in satisfying those preferences than the large urban area.  This was because larger urban 
governments provided a uniform level of public services to people who did not have uniform preferences for such 
services.  Households could "vote with their feet" by moving to the jurisdiction that provided the package of 
expenditures and taxes closest to what they desired. 
 
  The distribution of responsibilities between the Metro and local governments in Metropolitan Toronto is set 
out in Table 2.    While one might argue over specific items, such as that basic police services should continue to be 
a local responsibility, or that marriage licences should have been assigned to Metro, this distribution of 
responsibilities provided a reasonably harmonious balance between the political freedom of complete local control 
and  unrelenting  cost-minimizing  conformity in metropolitan centralization. 
 
2.  From Metro Toronto to Mega-City Toronto 
 
  In 1995, a new Ontario Government was elected.  In December 1996, the Minister of Municipal Affairs and 
Housing announced legislation to amalgamate Metro and its six member municipalities.  "Residents, taxpayers 
and business will all benefit from one Toronto," he said; "it will reduce duplication and overlap; local government 
will be streamlined, more accountable, more efficient."
v   The underlying assumption of these forced 
amalgamations was that "bigger is better,"
vi    and "better" meant lower costs. 
 
  This seemed to be the justification for the new policy, which would radically transform the system of 
delivering municipal services. The press release stated that "a single government for all of Metro Toronto would 
save taxpayers $300 million a year in the long term, . . . once the transition is complete."
vii  These savings would 




      But no mention was made about the effect on the range and quality of the services being delivered.    Nor were 
the fundamental objectives of the new policy stated clearly. 
 
  The normal analytical process would be to identify and evaluate the alternative methods of achieving 
objectives as defined in specific terms.  Statements by the Government are not specific enough to do this.  
Therefore, we have had to infer the likely objectives of the Provincial Government from appropriate information, 
including reports commissioned by the government; and also examine amalgamation according to the standard 
economic criteria for evaluating public policy. 
 
The Economic Case for Mega-City Toronto 
 
Economies of Scale 
 
  There may be government services where the unit costs of output fall in the long run, particularly where fixed 
costs make up a large proportion of total costs.  The distribution of water is one example (the so-called "natural 
monopoly" case).  If all households wanted this type of service, and if the demand for it were uniform throughout 






  However, not all activities of local government enjoy economies of scale. In setting up Metro in 1954, such 
activities were mostly assigned to the Metro level (See Table 2). If it became evident that some local activity could 
be handled more effectively at the Metro level, the system would allow the matter to be negotiated between the two 
levels of government. It would be difficult to imagine a situation so extreme that it could be handled only by 
amalgamation. 
 
  A case could be made that because the Toronto-based economy has extended into the surrounding areas, the 
Metro functions enjoying economies of scale should follow. This prospect has been proposed in the Golden 
Report.
x  Many such services were in fact extended to the GTA region, and were financed by the Province.  
These include major highways feeding into central Toronto (Highways 400, 401, 404 and 427) and the GO Transit 
commuter system.
xi  It would be economical to extend other services into this region.  Indeed, the Provincial 
Government has already drafted legislation to bring this about.  However, there would be no case for the lower 
levels of government, the former cities and boroughs of Metro, to be involved. 
 
  The above discussion suggests that there might be productivity gains from the consolidation of some services 
within a metropolitan region like Toronto, but this conclusion receives little support from empirical studies of the 
costs of local government services.  The evidence suggests that consolidation may benefit very small local 
government units. But beyond a certain size, average unit costs tend to change very little over a wide range of 
output. When local governments become very large, they tend to produce major diseconomies.
xii
 
  In a survey of empirical studies, Hirsch stated that the only significant economies of scale were in vertically 
integrated public services, specifically water, sewage and electricity distribution. In the other urban services, such 
as police protection, primary and secondary education, refuse collection, fire protection, primary and secondary 
education, and hospital services, economies of scale were either non-existent, very minor or uncertain (highs 
schools and hospitals). Furthermore, there is little evidence that horizontally integrated municipal services enjoy 
scale economies beyond a population size of 100,000 to 200,000,
xiii a population level reached in Toronto well 
before the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto was set up. 
 
Diseconomies  of  Scale 
 
  There are many government services which yield no significant economies of scale because of their inherently 
labour-intensive nature.
xiv  Most of these services were assigned to local governments under the old system.  
However, there are some municipal services which may yield economies of scale in a technical sense, but where 
quality deteriorates as scale increases. This is especially true when skilled labour is a significant component, such 
as in cultural and educational services.  Different preferences among communities mean that the demand for many 
of these services would not be uniform across a metropolitan area. Some local communities may want a municipal 
symphony orchestra, and others may not; but there is no justification for providing every community with a 
symphony orchestra, nor for a tax on all communities to pay for them.  Acceptance of this principle was a feature 
of the old Metro system based loosely on the Tiebout model, which recognized that different communities had 
different preferences for local government services. 
 
Duplication of Services 
 
  The Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing, noted earlier, stated that amalgamation "will reduce 
duplication and overlap: local government will be streamlined, more accountable, more efficient."  A cost study, 
commissioned by the Province, by the KPMG
xv consulting firm, was used to support these statements.  The 
KPMG study estimated that amalgamation would produce an annual saving of about $300 million by the year 2000. 
 About $100 million would come from replacing seven city governments with one.  The remaining $200 million 




capital requirements, but presumed that any extra costs associated with additional capital spending could be 
absorbed within the normal budget estimates and would not have any effect on the cost saving estimates. 
 
  The focus on cost saving is a curious inconsistency because the Conservative Government's emphasis has 
been on more competition, the very essence of which is "duplication and overlap."  In a private sector industry, 
such as the automobile industry, few economists would advocate improving efficiency by granting a monopoly to 
General Motors, and eliminating "duplication and overlap" by closing down all the others. 
 
  In Andrew Sancton's review of the KPMG study, he points out that many of the services expected to yield 
savings had already been amalgamated under Metro: 
 
"Why should practices in the police and ambulance services, transit commission, or sewage treatment and 
water purification departments change as a result of amalgamation?  Given the upheavals everywhere 
else, they are likely to be islands of calm in a sea of turmoil."
xvi
 
In fact, the savings from amalgamation are likely to be extremely limited.  The KPMG estimates of potential 
savings would be about 1.8 per cent of the initial 1998 operating cost estimates for the new City of Toronto, 
excluding transition costs. 
 
"Such a reduction is well within the range of what many Canadian municipalities have accomplished as part 
of ongoing fiscal retrenchment.  The numbers produced by KPMG actually demonstrate that 




  Transition costs would include changes bound to raise strong opposition from affected interest groups.  
Attempts to increase the yields of residential and business property taxes have already stirred up strong political 
opposition in Toronto,
xviii resulting in some relief in the increase in business taxes.  The planners of change have 
overlooked the role of interest groups with special technical skills.  These groups know more about how their 
systems work than anyone else, and they are in a strong position to emasculate government policies using technical 
evaluation criteria that politicians and bureaucrats do not fully understand. 
 
  The critical role of organized experts was demonstrated in earlier attempts to impose cost-saving policies 
"from the top down," such as PPBS (Planning-programming-budgeting systems).  To be effective, 
efficiency-improving models require the full cooperation of the  parties affected.
xix  Clearly, any proposals to 
civilianize the police service, contract out road and electrical maintenance, data collection or water treatment would 
be strongly opposed by the interest groups affected.
xx
 
  Even less understandable in dealing with a strongly unionized administrative structure such as the City of 
Toronto, is the assumption that collective agreements can be ignored.    As Sancton puts it, 
 
"Will unions agree to a contract that represents the average package of wages, benefits and working 
conditions among the previous agreements (thereby accepting cuts for a substantial number of their 
members), or will they successfully hold out for something above the average?"
xxi
 
Since the City of Toronto is linked with many labour unions, including some of the most powerful in the country, it 
should not be assumed that unions would cheerfully accept a policy that involved cuts in wages and other benefits 








  The economic literature on externalities (or spillovers) is enormous, reflecting their importance in economic 
activity.  The basic idea behind an externality is that "the actions of one person or institution may affect the 
welfare of another in ways that cannot be regulated by private agreements among the affected parties."
xxiii 
Externalities may be negative, such as smoke from a factory imposing pollution costs on its neighbors.  They may 
also be positive, such as when taxpayers in one municipality operate a public park used by non-residents.
xxiv
 
  Externalities are a major reason for government intervention in the economy.  However, government 
intervention is not called for if the problem is trivial, or if it can be dealt with by other means, such as private 
negotiations or through the courts.  Many negative externality problems are dealt with in small municipalities by 
land-use regulation, such as zoning. Environmental externalities, such as the pollution created in one community 
that damages the properties or health of residents in neighboring communities, are more difficult to deal with.  
Other forms of negative externalities arise from traffic congestion or even cultural matters.
xxv
 
  Where spillovers are significant, one solution is "to set up jurisdictions large enough to contain the 
spillovers. . . public transportation districts, environmental protection districts, mosquito abatement districts, and so 
on."
xxvi In other words, to internalize what previously were external costs (or benefits).    Since the minimum size of 
the jurisdiction required to contain spillovers is likely to vary with each situation,
xxvii the administrative costs of 
removing the externality could easily exceed the value of damage it caused. 
 
  In Metro Toronto, the likelihood of inter-jurisdictional conflicts was reduced by transferring responsibility for 
potential conflicts to the Metro level of government, as indicated in Table 2.    As the GTA expands, spillovers may 
extend beyond the boundaries of the new City of Toronto, and this was anticipated in the proposed legislation to 
create a Greater Toronto Services Board.
xxviii
 
3.  The Costs of Mega-City Toronto 
 
  From  the  economist's  point of view, the case for the amalgamation of the cities and borough of Metropolitan 
Toronto is clearly a weak one.  One reason for this is that most of the benefits from cost minimization were 
already achieved in setting up Metro.  Indeed, Metro was too large a unit for some municipal operations, and 
merging beyond the Metro level led to higher costs.  In empirical studies, costs tend to decline as the number of 
municipalities in a metropolitan area increases.
xxix    This is the competitive argument in the Golden Report. 
 
  In the sense of maximizing citizens' economic welfare, the Metro organization contained too few local 
governments rather than too many.
xxx   The existing pattern of local government for the Toronto urban area based 
on neighbourhoods was developed in the 1960s, and it came closer than Mega-city to the Stigler principle of 
efficient local government.    As Stigler notes: 
 
"If we give each governmental activity to the smallest governmental unit which can efficiently perform it, 
there will be a vast resurgence and revitalization of local government. . . An eminent and powerful 
structure of local government is a basic ingredient of a society which seeks to give to the individual the 
fullest possible freedom and responsibility."
xxxi
 
The attitudes of Toronto voters toward the amalgamation of Metro Toronto were expressed in a referendum held in 
the last municipal election in Metro Toronto.  Despite rejection of the proposal, the Provincial Government 
implemented amalgamation on January 1, 1998.
xxxii
 





  Given the results of the referendum, it is clear that the Provincial Government forced the new governmental 
structure on an unwilling community.  So, what was the Ontario Government's rationale for the amalgamation of 
Metropolitan Toronto?  Members of the government have said little about their goals for amalgamation beyond 
some earlier statements that it would result in lower municipal costs.  Some light may be shed on the question by 
looking at how the costs of government in Toronto will be shared between the province and municipality, 
compared with what it was under the Metro system.
xxxiii
 
  In early January of 1997, the Provincial Government made a number of announcements about a new division 
of responsibilities and costs between the provincial and the municipal governments.  Those changes are 
summarized in appendix Table 1.    The table is an edited version of another summary table included in a collection 
of news releases and statements made about the proposed changes.
xxxiv
 
  A quick review of the table indicates that the Province intended to download a significant share of their costs 
onto the municipalities.  The downloading of costs appears to be based on the view that the new regional cities 
would achieve significant cost savings.  Therefore, they could take on the new responsibilities and costs without 
any increase in the property tax burden on their residents. 
 
  In a recent statement in the provincial legislature, Premier Harris stated that he expected that all classes of 
property taxes would fall during the next three years despite any redistribution of costs mandated by the 
Province.
xxxv  Hence, the Provincial Government believed that the new division of costs would help reduce the 
provincial income tax by shifting some of their existing costs onto the cities.  Also, since they believed that there 
were significant cost savings in amalgamation, the new cities could absorb the extra costs and also reduce their own 
property tax burdens. 
 
  Unfortunately, the facts seem to point in the opposite direction.  In order to show this, two issues will be 
discussed; the new property tax system and the budget for the new City of Toronto. 
 
5.  Property Tax Assessment 
 
  The assessment of property values for tax purposes was a municipal responsibility until 1969, when it was 
taken over by the Province.  The Province set out to reassess all property on the basis of market value.  However 
in 1978, the process was halted, but the Province undertook market value assessment for any municipality that 
specifically requested it.    Some municipalities made a request, but Toronto did not. 
 
  In 1997, the Province passed the Fair Municipal Finance Act, which would reform the local property tax 
system based on 1996 values.    The new Act also required the updating    of these assessments on a regular basis. 
 
  Release of the revised property values brought about unprecedented opposition and protests from property 
owners who faced huge increases in taxes.    Many retirees and low income households found that their taxes would 
more than double, and they feared that they would have to sell their homes in a market that would be glutted by the 
forced sales of others in the same situation. 
 
  One of the basic problems was that houses in Metro Toronto had not been regularly reassessed.  The owners 
of older homes paid taxes based on old valuations.  In some cases, the assessments were over 30 years old.  As 
homes changed hands, the relatively low tax bases were capitalized into current market values.  The "premium" 
for low-tax properties escalated in step with the increasing demand for housing in a rapidly growing urban area.  
But the new 1996 assessments made no allowance for any distortions in the market.  When the new values for 
taxation were announced, the "premium" evaporated, and the arbitrarily-determined 1996 prices of older housing 





  That was the problem in principle.  In practice the situation was even worse because the values that emerged 
from the Province's computer programs seemed arbitrary.  Identical houses side by side were valued at widely 
differing figures.    Small modest homes on small lots were often assessed at higher values than large elegant homes 
on large lots.  The re-assessment exercise was a rush job, trying to re-structure patterns of relative house values 
that had developed over decades in a few months.  There was no time for any physical inspection of houses C the 
values were based on the most recent sales in the area.
xxxvi  The estimates seem to have been done with computers 
by students with little training in statistics or asset values. 
 
  Having determined the values of Toronto's houses, the next step was to establish the tax rate, which had to be 
"revenue neutral."  The initial rate selected was 1.23 per cent, which would yield the same revenue as before 
amalgamation, but with a greatly altered distribution of the tax burden.  The averaging process produced large 
zones of taxpayers who would pay substantially higher taxes, and other zones in which taxes would be much lower. 
 There did not seem to be much relationship between tax liability and taxpayer income.
xxxvii  Subsequently the 
City Council realized that 1.23 per cent would not be enough, so rather than exacerbate angry taxpayers further, the 
Council borrowed $100 million from the Provincial Government.  However, even at this late stage (June, 1998), 
the Council does not know what the 1998 tax rate will be. 
 
6.  Property Tax Assessment on Business 
 
  The municipal business tax is applied to most commercial and industrial properties in Canada.  Unlike 
residential property taxes, business taxes are levied on the occupier rather than the owner of real property.  In 
Ontario the assessed value for business tax purposes is determined by applying specific percentages to the assessed 
value of business property. 
 
  On March 3, 1998, financial officials of the City of Toronto released the new assessments on business and 
commercial properties, which showed substantial increases with the heaviest relative increases on small businesses. 
 Nearly half of commercial business in Toronto found their taxes would increase by 100 per cent or more.  Not 
surprisingly, the protests were loud, strong and persistent. 
 
  As noted earlier, residential taxpayers will no longer pay property tax to finance education, but businesses will. 
  Businesses in Toronto, however, will pay taxes at twice the rate paid by most other municipalities in the Province, 
including the areas immediately surrounding the City (the Greater Toronto Area), providing a further incentive for 
businesses to move to the suburbs. 
 
  There were anomalies in the valuation system:  the "market values" of residential properties and small 
retailers were inferred from recent sales in the area.  The values of major commercial properties and office towers 
were based on the capitalized values of rents.  The result was that the assessed values of small businesses went up, 
some by 1000 per cent, and the assessments of bank towers went down!
xxxviii
 
  Apartment buildings were subject to a different set of rules.  In Metro, the property tax on apartment 
buildings was about three to four times the rate on single-family houses and condominiums.  In the new 
Toronto the discrimination continues, justified on the curious ground that owners of rental buildings would 
not pass on tax cuts to tenants.
xxxix
 
  Faced with the business community's tax protests, the Toronto and Ontario Governments agreed to 
limit property tax increases for business to 2.5 per cent a year.  This was not 2.5 per cent of the current 




City required more money, it would have to increase residential taxes. 
 
  To accommodate the changes, the Provincial Government introduced Bill 16 in May, 1998.  The 
new bill gives cities and towns the option of putting an annual 2.5% cap on business tax increases.  The 






 Table  3 
  Budget Estimates for Community Services 
  City of Toronto, 1997 and 1998 




































 Table  4 
  Budget Estimates for the 
  Toronto Transit Commission, 1997 and 1998 
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  Metro  Toronto 












  81,865 




































Source:  Toronto  Star, May 18, 1998. 
7.  The City of Toronto Budget 
 
  The problems associated with property tax assessment and the late passage of Bill 16, has had a significant 
cost impact on the new City of Toronto.  On June 5, 1997, the City's chief financial officer stated that because of 
the late delivery of the property assessment rolls from the Province, the property tax bills, normally issued in May, 
would be delayed until August.
xli  While the new City has set most of its budget for 1998, it hasn't yet decided 
how to set the tax burden among the different classes of taxpayers.  This is not likely to happen until some time in 
July or even later.    As a result, the City may have to borrow to finance its spending until the income from the new 
property tax is received. 
 
8.  The 1998 City Budget 
 
  The 1998 budget is still being revised as the City Council seeks new ways of reducing its costs.  However, 
the general aim of the budget is to freeze overall 1998 property tax receipts at their 1997 level so that there will be 
no overall increase in City taxes.  Because of the new Provincial Assessment Program and the proposal to 
eliminate or reduce the rate of increase in business taxes, the distribution of the property tax burden is likely to be 
very different than it was in 1997.  The 1998 budget is an attempt by the new City to slow down the adjustment 
process by budgeting for an overall zero net tax change and by trying to maintain service levels close to their 1997 
levels. 
 
  The 1999 budget is expected to have significant cost reductions and likely significant reductions in services if 
the tax burden is to be maintained.    The problem the City faces is how to cope with the downloading of Provincial 
costs on the new City. 
 
  Two examples will be cited to show the problem that the new City faces.  Table 3 shows the community 
services budget, which includes spending on social welfare, public health and public housing among others.  This 
budget is projected to include an increase of $627 million in spending compared to the 1997 budget.  Most of this 
increase is related to the downloading of Provincial costs on the City.  After user fees and other revenue are 
included, the budget produces a net deficit of $415 million which will have to be financed by property and business 
taxes. 
 
  The operating budget of the Toronto Transit Commission, in Table 4, shows a similar pattern.  In 1997, it 
had an operating cost deficit of $159 million which was financed by subsidies from Metro and the Province.  In 
1998, the TTC expects a deficit of $152 million and this will also have to come out of City tax revenue because of 




  What is the verdict on Mega Toronto after the first six months? The first casualty has been the cost savings for 
municipalities, which were the driving force for the great reforms. Since these cost savings would be so great, the 
municipalities could finance their own expenditures.   The Province could then cut grants to the municipalities, 
and the savings would make it possible to cut income taxes by 30%, as promised in the election campaign.
xlii  
 
  What has become evident, however, is that costs will not fall in the amalgamated City.  Costs will rise even 
to maintain services at the 1997 levels.    The evidence indicates that any cost savings will be minor. 
 





xliii Again, the answer seemed simple. Update the tax base, change the values of all properties to current market 
values, and sweep aside decades of capitalization, rent control and other market adjustments to the demand and 
supply of land and housing. Such methods of estimating values may make some sense in a daily market for the 
flow of commodities, but the prices set in the property market are for marginal changes in the housing stock. In a 
city of three million, current housing sales represent a minute fraction of the housing stock, and are hardly the basis 
for re-calculating the values of the entire housing stock.   
 
  The results of the new assessment system have been chaotic. The new assessments on business were so clearly 
inequitable and incompatible with business efficiency that the Provincial Government had to accept an expedient 
but rigid policy that sets severe limits on future tax increases.  The residential assessments were arbitrary and 
inequitable among individuals, and inequitable among the former municipalities, as the map shows.  Far from 
being "revenue neutral," the new City's revenues were not sufficient to finance new Toronto's expenditures, and 
$100 million had to be borrowed from the Province.  At this late stage (end of June), the City Council does not 
know what the 1998 tax rate will be, but warnings are being issued that it will be considerably higher than the 1.23 
per cent that set off the wave of protests in March and April.   
 
  One of the basic misjudgments in the Toronto experience has been the Provincial Government's assumption 
that the Toronto economy, the GTA and the Provincial economy were separate entities.  They are in fact an 
integrated economy.  The central City provides accounting, banking and legal services for firms, as well as 
cultural and education amenities, for the urban region and the Province.  The outer urban region provides not only 
housing but also manufacturing, retail trade, wholesaling and other business services for the whole region. The 
relevant model is not the self-sufficient country town but the provincial economy, and all sectors that provide basic 
services for the whole. 
 
  The correct role for the Province is one of co-ordination. It is not the proper role of residents of Toronto to 
finance the services enjoyed by the whole region and the Province. The growing use of intergovernmental grants is 
a recognition of these interdependencies in modern economies. The attempt of the Provincial Government to shift a 
large share of the financing of the region to the businesses and residents in the central core will result, not only in 
excessive administrative and compliance costs (which are already evident), but also in increased outflows in 
employment and industry to the detriment of the region's development. The attempt to finance local government by 




  Many of the problems faced by the new City of Toronto arose from a determination of the Provincial 
Government not only to force amalgamation, but also to introduce a large number of other changes, and especially, 
the new property tax assessment system and the downloading of costs.  These changes were introduced without 
any clear plan of how to handle the consequences of all of these changes occurring at the same time. 
 
  Therefore, the economics of unsystemic planning of the changes has led to significant extra costs, confusion 
about how to proceed, and a major future confrontation between the City and the Province, and the City and its 
employees and taxpayers.  As one cynical observer has pointed out, the Provincial Government has a tendency to 






ENDNOTES   
  i..  See the extensive literature on new towns, from Ebenezer Howard's Garden Cities of Tomorrow (published 1898) to the 
present.  A.  J.  Robinson,  Economics of New Towns (New York: Praeger, 1975), Ch. 1. 
 ii..  For census purposes, a Census Metropolitan Area (CMA) represents the main labour market of a continuous built-up area 
having a population of 100,000 or more.  In the 1951 census, the Toronto CMA had a population of 1,117,470.  The City of 
Toronto's population was 675,754 or 60% of the total CMA's population. 
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